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Abstract. This paper evaluates the use of climate-based information in drought mitigation in
Ceara¤ , Northeast Brazil. It examines two policies ^ a seed-distribution program (Hora de Plantar)
and the Emergency Drought-Relief Program ^ that use climate information produced by
FUNCEME (Ceara¤ ’s Foundation for Meteorological and Hydrological Resources) to implement
drought planning. It argues that, in politically charged policy-making environments, the use of
climate forecast information may go beyond its problem-solving function to in£uence broader
issues of accountability and democratization. In Ceara¤ ’s politically charged environment, techno-
crats rely on scienti¢c information about climate to insulate policy-making from both political
‘meddling’ and public accountability. However, insulation a¡orded by the use of climate informa-
tion has played di¡erent roles in the policy areas examined in this study. While in drought emer-
gency-relief planning the use of climate information critically contributed to the democratization of
policy implementation, in agricultural planning, it worked towards further insulating decision-
making from public accountability and client participation. Thus, the use of climate information is
context-dependent, that is, the distribution of costs and bene¢ts associated with information use in
policymaking depends on the social, political, and cultural context in which information producers
and users work. Moreover, climate information can be used in ways ^ positive or negative ^
signi¢cantly di¡erent from the use that information producers intended.
Introduction
Can science save Northeast Brazil? In this region, castigated by recurrent
drought, policy-makers have implemented a wide range of policies to mitigate
the extreme physical and social e¡ects of dry climate.Yet, most of these policies
have failed to reduce the vulnerability of subsistence farmers to drought.1
Recently, the emergence of new scienti¢c tools for climate monitoring and
prediction (especially the El Nin‹ o-Southern Oscillation ^ ENSO forecasts) has
stimulated the design of a new class of proactive drought policies based on the
availability of seasonal climate forecasts with a lead-time of up to a year in
some regons.2 Since the early 1990s, the government of Ceara¤ , one of the
poorest states in the Northeast, has sought to use seasonal climate forecasting
information produced by FUNCEME (Ceara¤ ’s Foundation for Meteorological
and Hydrological Resources) to implement several governmental policies and
programs in the areas of civil defense, water management, and agriculture.3
How has climate information been used in drought planning in Ceara¤ ? This
study argues that, in Ceara¤ , the implications of the use of climate information
may go beyond its contribution to problem-solving and have an impact on
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broader issues such as public accountability and democratization of the public
policy-making process. Whereas a few scholars have called attention to equity
issues linked to the use of seasonal climate forecasting (Pfa¡ et al., 1999;
Glantz, 1996), the literature on the politics of prediction use, especially in less
developed countries, is surprisingly sparse.4
This study evaluates the use of climate-related information, in particular
seasonal climate forecasting in two programs. The ¢rst program, Hora de
Plantar (Time to Plant) ^ implemented by Ceara¤ ’s Secretary of Rural Develop-
ment (Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Rural ^ SDR) ^ focuses on the distribu-
tion of high-quality seed among subsistence farmers in Ceara¤ . In principle, the
program uses climate information to establish a ¢xed planting calendar in
which seed is distributed to farmers based on the application of a climate-soil
model.5 The assumption underlying this program is that small farmers lack the
technology to make the best possible choices in an unpredictable environment.
The decision to maintain the planting calendar is motivated by policy-makers’
beliefs that, if left to their own devices, farmers ‘waste’ the high quality seeds by
either planting too soon or eating the seeds when faced with a food shortage.
The second program, Emergency Drought-Relief ^ implemented by Ceara¤ ’s
Civil Defense (Defesa Civil) ^ uses climate information provided by FUNCEME
to assess the level of need for emergency funds in each munic|¤ pio6 in the state.
For the past ten years, the program has comprised three main actions: the
monthly distribution of food baskets (cestas ba¤ sicas) among needy families,
the creation of emergency work fronts, and the supply of potable water to
communities in distress. Since 1997, at the onset of a drought, the state Civil
Defense employs a munic|¤ pio-level monitoring system based on quantity and
distribution of rainfall, vegetation indexes, yield losses, and social tension
episodes to establish a triage ranking for government response (Ceara¤ , Governo
do Estado do, 1997).
These two programs will be evaluated focusing both on policy outcome and
on their potential impact on broader processes of decision- and policy-making
in the context of Brazil’s young democracy. Regarding policy outcome of both
programs, this study seeks to assess, ¢rst, seasonal climate forecasting’s contri-
bution to problem-solving; and second, which ^ and how ^ di¡erent social
actors are negatively a¡ected or bene¢t from policy outcome. Regarding the
impact of both programs on democratization, it aims at understanding the role
of seasonal climate forecasts in promoting or hindering processes that charac-
terize democratic policy-making, such as accountability, transparency, societal
participation, and equity. By analyzing the interaction between state-level tech-
nocracies, scienti¢c institutions, and policy clients in the context of these two
programs, this study intends to contribute to the understanding of the co-
production of science and policy. More broadly, it seeks to illuminate the role
scienti¢c knowledge may play in technocratic decision-making and democracy.
It is important to emphasize that it is not this study’s claim that seasonal
forecast producers are unaware of or do not care how clients use their product ^
although that still may be the case in some instances. Rather, this discussion is
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intended to provide climate forecast producers with empirical examples of the
many, and sometimes unwarranted, uses of forecasts in di¡erent policy systems.
Only if we understand how decisions are made, both at the policy and societal
levels, will it be possible to implement policies that not only e¡ectively mitigate
negative consequences of climate-related phenomena but also promote demo-
cratic values such as fairness, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in
policy-making.
Both programs have been hailed as successful policy-making.Hora de Plantar
is frequently cited as an example of the tremendous potential for the application
of seasonal climate forecasting in policymaking and as evidence of the kinds of
positive outcome this type of tool can produce in less developed countries (IAI,
1994; Moura et al., 1992; Golnaraghi and Kaul, 1995; Glantz, 1996). Similarly,
Emergency Drought-Relief has been described as ‘a radical departure from the
past’ (Tendler, 1997: p. 46) in which Ceara¤ ’s new progressive state government
managed to avoid traditional patterns of clientelism and corruption in drought
planning. The next section provides a brief description of drought planning in
Ceara¤ and suggests that, despite the substantial progress achieved by recent state
administrations, there is still much to be done to decrease the vulnerability of the
poor to drought.
The politics of drought planning in Ceara¤
Ceara¤ , Northeast Brazil. Ceara¤ lies on the northern coast of Brazil and is one
of the nine states that form the region known as Northeast Brazil, orNordeste.
The majority of the state falls within the semi-arid region of the Northeast
known as the serta‹ o (hinterland), where most of the rainfall is concentrated
within a three- to four-month period between December and March (Ceara¤ ,
Governo do Estado do, 1995: p. 22). This period corresponds roughly to the
state’s planting season and is popularly known in the region as ‘the winter,’
despite corresponding to Brazil’s summer months. !!!Figure 1!!!
Ceara¤ is one of Brazil’s poorest states, having a population of 7 million
people, of which 67 percent live in urban areas (IPLANCE, 2000). Despite
high levels of poverty all over the state, for the past ten years, Ceara¤ has been
undergoing a remarkable political and socio-economic change that has criti-
cally a¡ected its socio-economic indicators. In 1997, for example, while Brazil
was growing at 3.2 percent a year, Ceara¤ ’s growth rate was 4.5 percent. Table 1
illustrates the evolution of several socioeconomic indicators in Ceara¤ between
1987 and 1997.
Although Ceara¤ has traditionally been an agricultural state, this sector has
been increasingly losing its prominence to industry and service. Today, the
agricultural sector accounts for only 5.3 percent of the state’s GNP, but it
employs 39.7 percent of its labor force (IPLANCE, 2000). Thus, while agricul-
ture has lost economic importance, it still carries tremendous social signi¢-
cance within the state’s policy-making machine.
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Table 1. Evolution of the main socioeconomic indicators in Ceara¤ (1987^1997).
Indicators 1987 1997
Infant mortality rate 137.0a 40.0
Population with monthly income below minimum wage (%) 33.5b 19.9
Illiteracy (% of population over 7 years old) 43.3 31.7
Level of education (% of population between 7^14 years old) 56.7 95.0
Households with piped water (%) 31.5 53.3
Households with electricity (%) 53.1c 75.6
Households with garbage collection (%) 28.0 49.0
Source : IBGE/PNAD, SEDUC, SESA, Government of the state of Ceara¤ , 2000.
a 1986.
b The rate for 1997 is 42/1,000.
c 1985.
Fig. 1. Map of study area.
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Drought-Relief and Policy-making in Northeast Brazil and Ceara¤ . In Northeast
Brazil, reports about devastating drought episodes trace back to the ¢rst Jesuit
missionaries, who arrived in this region in the late 1500s. From 1877^1879, a
severe drought resulted in widespread famine in which approximately 500,000
people (four percent of the Brazilian population at the time) died and three
million migrated from the region (Villa, 2000: p. 83). More recently, the
drought of 1979^1983 a¡ected eighteen million people, and the government
(local, state, and federal) spent approximately US$1.8 billion on emergency
programs (Magalha‹ es et al., 1988: p. 293).7
For over a century, local and federal governments have attempted to alleviate
the negative e¡ects of drought in this region.8 In 1856, Emperor Pedro II of
Brazil created the ¢rst governmental commission to study the drought problem
in the Northeast and make policy recommendations. Because drought at the
time was perceived mostly as a consequence of water shortage, the solution
focused on the construction of massive waterworks ^ especially reservoirs ^
which would both alleviate water scarcity and employ large numbers of impov-
erished local residents. Additionally, the Commission recommended the con-
struction of railways and the creation of the ¢rst meteorological observatories
in the region. By 1910, Northeast Brazil had 124 rain gauges and four hydro-
meter stations installed. Although di¡erent governments sought to implement
a wide range of drought-related policies, for many years the expansion of the
water supply system remained the focal point of drought planning in the North-
east. Between 1884 and 1983, the National Department of Public Works and
Drought Relief (Departamento Nacional de Obras e Combate a' s Seca ^
DNOCS), built 1,121 dams, exceeding 15 billion cubic meters of water capacity
(IBGE, 1984, cited in Pessoa, 1987).
Moreover, from the 1950s until the 1990s, the state of Cerara¤ also invested
substantially in cloud-seeding research and experiments designed to increase
rainfall over the region. In the 1970s, the state bought three planes and carried
out cloud-seeding experiments regularly.9 Although there was scarcely any
documented success, cloud-seeding became a powerful political tool, since it
conveyed the idea of government ‘action.’ Indeed, it was common for politi-
cians to request that ‘seeding campaigns’ be carried out in their regional strong-
holds, especially around election time. According to a local policy-maker, ‘The
sound of the airplane £ying over their regions became more important than the
rains they were supposed to bring.’10 When FUNCEME phased out the pro-
gram in the 1990s, the agency’s president was harshly criticized for selling two
of the cloud-seeding planes (Lemos et al., 2002). Hence, since the beginning,
despite the devastating social impacts of droughts, policy-making favored a
techno-scienti¢c approach that focused on expanding the availability of water,
rather than focusing on anti-poverty policies that would have decreased the
vulnerability of poor rural populations to climate events.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the policy focus started to change, at least on paper.
Federal and state governments created several programs aimed at addressing
di¡erent aspects of vulnerability to drought (including agrarian reform and
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industrialization). However, most of these programs met little or no success.11
Much of the policy failure can be traced to ‘the drought industry’ ^ as the
drought-relief public policy-making apparatus is known in Brazil. Early on,
powerful local groups captured the drought-relief policy apparatus, which
mostly bene¢ted large landowners and local political bosses (Goldsmith and
Wilson, 1991; Tendler, 1997; Villa, 2000). Perhaps the most emblematic exam-
ples of the drought industry are the federally funded emergency work fronts
that paid poor, dislodged subsistence farmers less than minimum wage to work
on the construction of public works (e.g., dams, irrigation channels, or roads) ^
either on private or public land. Historically, these fronts have been a powerful
bargaining instrument for local political bosses who, through classic clientelism,
exchange placement in work fronts for votes. Moreover, such fronts mostly
bene¢t large landholders and fail to create a sustainable economic program
that might mitigate long-term vulnerability to drought.
During the 1987 drought ^ in the context of Ceara¤ ’s ¢rst openly reformist
government ^ drought planning underwent dramatic change.12 Rather than
short-term emergency actions mostly bene¢ting large landowners, the state
government decided to focus on long-term projects associated with communi-
ties. A wide range of new programs emphasized rural development and allevia-
tion of poverty through agrarian reform, creation of irrigated zones, develop-
ment of hydrographic microbasins, rational water management, development
of micro- and small businesses in the interior, education, basic rural health and
sanitation, agro-industry, rural extension, creation of food security programs,
community development, etc. (Magalha‹ es, 1991: p. 33). These programs encour-
aged more community involvement in the decision-making process. However,
as with other policies in the past, many of these initiatives never survived the
planning stage, while others either only partially achieved their goals or failed
altogether. Although these programs intended to strenghten the resistance of
the rural population to drought by stabilizing production for the small farmer,
here again implementation mostly concentrated on the increase of water supply
instead of longer-term redistributive policies. Consequently, large segments of
Ceara¤ ’s poor remain signi¢cantly vulnerable to climate variability (Lemos et
al., 2002).13
Despite overall disappointing results, one exception was the implementation
of Emergency Drought-Relief. For the ¢rst time, Ceara¤ ’s government created a
centralized structure for drought response that coordinated the e¡orts from all
areas of the state government (Carvalho, 1993). This structure, organized under
the state department for Social Action (Secretaria de Ac a‹ o Social ^ SAS), was a
departure from the clientelism-infested policy structure of the past. The most
innovative aspect of the new policy approach was the creation of local, com-
munity-based emergency committees and the design of new criteria for the kind
of works and workers that would qualify for funding (Tendler, 1997). The new
Community Action Groups (Grupos de Ac a‹ o Communita¤ ria ^ GACs) became
focal points for decision-making regarding Emergency Drought-Relief. In con-
trast to previous programs, where local politicians controlled relief funds and
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used jobs as political currency, the GACs (coordinated by local extension
agents) were administered by representatives of several sectors of society, e.g.,
the Church, rural labor unions, city council representatives, landowners asso-
ciations, state o⁄cials, and professional associations. Tendler (1997: p. 50)
describes the workings of the new GACs:
‘In a process that was quite unusual for rural Brazil, the GACs would
deliberate in weekly meetings over a set of two lists submitted by each village
or community in the munic|¤ pio, the villages ranging in size from ¢ve to 200
families. One list ranked a set of projects desired by that particular com-
munity; the other ranked those families hardest hit by the drought and most
in need of employment and relief supplies.’
In addition, government emergency programs cancelled large-scale public works
projects in an e¡ort to reduce the widespread displacement of workers and
separation of families.Work projects shifted from individual, private properties
to public services, except for hydrological projects where property owners agreed
to allow the entire community access to the water (Magalha‹ es et al., 1991).
Despite these improvements, what these di¡erent drought-related policies in
Ceara¤ share is a strong emphasis on solutions that fail to address the structural
economic and social inequalities. These inequalities critically shape the way
di¡erent groups are vulnerable to climate-related phenomena. Indeed, vulner-
ability to drought in NE Brazil is more than a climate-related issue; it is the
consequence of historical patterns of unequal distribution of wealth, land, and
power that date back to Brazil’s colonial times. Thus, vulnerability-reducing
policies should necessarily address such inequalities. For example, evidence
from household surveys shows that vulnerability of subsistence farmers to
drought is critically a¡ected by non-farm income, especially pensions and
remittances (Lemos et al., 2002). This suggests that policies directed to diversi-
fying household income could more e¡ectively decrease vulnerability to
drought. Despite such evidence and widespread belief that rainfed subsistence
agriculture is neither economically nor environmentally sustainable, in North-
east Brazil (where at least four in every ten years are a¡ected by drought),
policy-makers have favored ‘technical ¢xes’ rather than implementing re-dis-
tributive policies. The underlying rationale is that such policies would decrease
the dependence of poor households on governmental programs, which, in turn,
would erode the electoral base of those politicians who rely on clientelistic
practices of exchanging goods and services for votes. Accordingly, because
long-term adaptive policies might challenge the power structure of the region
and therefore meet with strong political opposition, the use of sophisticated
science-based policy tools might provide policy-makers in Ceara¤ with a politi-
cally ‘palatable’ alternative.14 In this sense, seasonal climate forecasting may be
just one among many tools allowing te¤ cnicos15 in Ceara¤ to avoid policies that
would challenge politicians’ established power base, especially in rural strong-
holds.
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In this context, it is not surprising that policy-makers in Ceara¤ ’s highly
politicized policy-making environment would favor a technocratic decision-
making approach to Hora de Plantar and Emergency Drought-Relief. From
Ceara¤ ’s te¤ cnicos point of view, the advantages of technocratic decision-making
are many. Because policy tools originate in ‘hard’ research science ^ therefore
requiring technical expertise for their use ^ they can insulate policy-makers
from political meddling and from powerful interest groups trying to in£uence
policy implementation and outcome. In Northeast Brazil, for example, it is
common for local mayors to try to pressure Emergency Drought-Relief te¤ cnicos
to rank their munic|¤ pio as requiring high priority to receive federal funds ear-
marked for droughts mitigation. It is also common for individual politicians to
exchange eligibility to public services for votes. Other characteristics of techno-
cratic decision-making might also appeal to Ceara¤ ’s te¤ cnicos. First, technocratic
decision-making is understood as increasing legitimacy and feasibility and
reducing dissent (Jasano¡, 1990; Ezrahi, 1990). Second, technocrats believe
technical insulation will decrease the vulnerability of policies to criticism from
non-technical people and politicians (Steel et al., 1993).16 Finally, scienti¢c
decision-making holds the promise of value-free decisions about public policy,
therefore bypassing the messiness of dialogue and negotiation (Jamieson,
2000). Technocratic decision-making, however, may defy basic precepts of
democracy by limiting the number of participants and policy alternatives, while
creating an oligarchy of technocrats unaccountable to elected o⁄cials and
clients (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983). Indeed, when trying to gain political advantage,
groups with opposing interests may be tempted to exaggerate or distort infor-
mation when that information serves to support the interests of one group over
another. In this process, information is not neutral in terms of power relation-
ships and institutions. As technical analysis becomes more prominent than
other informational input (including opinions and interests of non-technical
sources), it may ‘squeeze out other forms of information, decisionmaking
routines, and claims’ (Healy and Ascher, 1995: p. 13).
Both perspectives permeate the Ceara¤ case study, since the very same rea-
sons that attract policy-makers can alienate other important actors in the
policy-making process, such as policy clients. The next section examines the
use of seasonal climate forecasts in Hora de Plantar and Emergency Drought-
Relief, taking into consideration not only policy outcome but also its potential
to go beyond policy solutions to a¡ect democratization.
Technocratic response to drought:Hora de Plantar and Emergency Drought-
Relief
In principle, both Hora de Plantar and Emergency Drought-Relief use a wide
range of science-based information, including climate forecasts. Indeed, as
mentioned earlier, the draw of science-based policy tools as a means of insulat-
ing decision-making from a highly politicized policy environment is high. In
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Ceara¤ , many of the essential qualities people associate with science (e.g., thor-
oughness, objectivity, the search for truth, and rationality) are also the most
desirable characteristics of e⁄cient and e¡ective policy-making. These qualities
are sought after by state-level policymakers, especially te¤ cnicos. In Brazil and
other Latin American countries, the tradition of technocratic policy-making
goes back to the XIX century, when, in an attempt to modernize the newly
independent countries, governments ‘imported’ te¤ cnicos from Europe to build a
much-needed local infrastructure. These te¤ cnicos were often considered more
desirable than local personnel, not only because of their superior European
education but also because of their perceived lack of a political agenda, a fact
that suited local political elites who wished to govern unchallenged. However,
by the 1930s, a strong and increasingly autonomous bureaucracy had emerged,
based on the multiplication and expansion of both public and private organi-
zations. While in the classic Weberian model politicians and bureaucrats play
very distinct roles ^ that is, politicians make policy decisions and bureaucrats
implement them ^ in Brazil, the line between politics and bureaucracy has been
purposely blurred under the guise of improving ‘e⁄ciency’ in policy-making.
The underlying assumption was that politicians, because of their vulnerability
to electoral politics, may fall prey to special interests and clientelistic relation-
ships, which, in turn, could lead to biased policy decisions. Bureaucrats, on the
other hand, because they are bound by their expertise and, in principle, should
have no political agenda, are much more quali¢ed to make the ‘best’ policy
decisions and implement them e⁄ciently. Thus, in order to be able to do their
jobs properly, bureaucrats needed to be protected from politics and politicians.
However, even within the same government structure, all bureaucrats were not
created equal. Because some sectors of the state bureaucracy had become
targets for politicians who used jobs for political bargaining, they were not
expected to function at the same level of e⁄ciency as other agencies where
expertise, not political patronage, was the main criterion used to select employ-
ees. Hence, some sectors ^ recognized as technocracies ^ experienced special
treatment within the bureaucracy.
This had been particularly the case in the 1960s and 1970s when political
leadership (both democratically elected and authoritarian) attempted to insu-
late technocratic organizations as a strategy to increase e⁄ciency in promoting
develoment. Thus, leaders purposely singled out some agencies ^ especially the
ones responsible for economic policy-making ^ and provided them with resources
(both human and ¢nancial) and regulations that followed them to perform at a
higher level of competency than other sectors of the government. Nunes and
Geddes (1987: p. 104) de¢ne Brazil’s bureaucratic insulation as ‘the capacity
[these] organizations have to maintain their organizational integrity and to
pursue their own goals.’ Such technocracies also operated from decentralized
agencies (public and mixed enterprises and autonomous entities) that were
relatively insulated from practices such as clientelism, nepotism, spoils systems,
and corruption (Nunes and Geddes, 1987). However, bureaucratic insulation
also rendered these agencies virtually unaccountable to other parts of the state
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as well as to society. Thus, while in the short run bureaucratic insulation can
incrase decision-making capacity and promote e¡ective implementation of
policy, in the end it can erode critical processes essential to democratic policy-
making, such as accountability, transparency, social participation, and equity.
While most of the literature examining technocratic insulation and policy in
Brazil has focused on either economic policy-making at the national level or
state-engendered insulation (Nunes and Geddes, 1987; Geddes, 1990; Steel et
al., 1993; Schneider, 1993; Centeno and Silva, 1998), less attention has been
paid to the actions of mid-level, state technocracies, whose power is rooted in
their technical expertise. The application of scienti¢c information such as
seasonal climate forecasting, in principle, provides policy-makers with an apoli-
tical tool that serves as the basis for a technocratic model of policy-making
historically grounded on Brazilian tradition. Furthermore, as a policy tool,
climate forecasting holds the promise of mitigating and preparing for natural
hazards that were previously perceived as unpredictable. In both senses, policy-
makers may perceive the emergence of science-based tools as a highly desirable
policy option.Yet, in Ceara¤ , technocratic insulation might become increasingly
untenable in the context of political reform and democratization. Moreover,
attempts to insulate the process can back¢re and produce exactly the opposite
e¡ect, that is, excessive politicization of the policy process and unwise discredit-
ing of speci¢c policy tools. That may be true in at least one of the cases
analyzed below.
Hora de Plantar. To forecast seasonal climate in the Northeast, FUNCEME
uses a ‘conceptual model’ that summarizes and evaluates the di¡erent sets of
phenomena a¡ecting the region’s quantity and distribution of rainfall.17 To
build its forecast, FUNCEME te¤ cnicos calculate the probability of how each of
the phenomena will a¡ect rainfall for the rainy season (February^May). Each
phenomenon is then classi¢ed as ‘neutral,’ ‘favorable’ or ‘unfavorable.’18
FUNCEME then releases the prognosis of the season, ¢rst to the government
and later to the media.
The Hora de Plantar program, started in 1989, has relied heavily on climate
and soil information provided by FUNCEME. The program starts with the
acquisition of high-quality seeds and their distribution to regional centers, where
they are stored until the determined ‘time to plant.’ Each head of a farming
household receives enough seed to plant a maximum of two hectares. To qualify
for the program, subsistence farmers register with the local rural exension
agency. In exchange for the selected seeds, farmers ‘pay’ the government with
grain harvested during the previous season (the same amount as the seeds they
receive) or receive credit to be paid the following year (Ceara¤ , Governo do
Estado do, 1997). Although the program is not mandatory, many poor house-
holds depend on government seed, especially in years of uneven rainfall distri-
bution ^ when farmers might have to plant twice in the same season after their
¢rst crop fails. Government seed is also critical during multiple drought years,
when farmers run out of their own seeds after several years of crop failure.
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Since 1992, The Secretary of Rural Development (SDR) has used a com-
puter-based soil humidity model developed by FUNCEME (Andrade, 1995) to
organize seed distribution. This mathematical model, used to calculate soil
humidity, incorporates seven main physical parameters: soil type, daily precipi-
tation, evaporation, maximum water retention capacity of the soil, water in¢l-
tration capacity, run-o¡, and water percolation. Data collection begins with
FUNCEME’s monitoring of rainfall daily at 184 rain stations located in each
munic|¤ pio within Ceara¤ . Then FUNCEME te¤ cnicos enter the data into the
model, which calculates the level of soil humidity and its ability to retain enough
moisture for plant growth (Andrade, 1995). From the model, FUNCEME estab-
lishes the number of days that it will take for the soil to lose the moisture gained
from the last rainfall. FUNCEME then maps the munic|¤ pios whose soils can
retain eleven days of moisture and sends this information to the SDR, which, in
turn, authorizes seed distribution for these munic|¤ pios (Andrade, 1995).19 Here
it is important to emphasize that, despite the fact that seasonal climate fore-
casts are not included in the model, there is a widespread perception among
FUNCEME and SDR’s te¤ cnicos andHora de Plantar clients that seed distribu-
tion is directly connected to FUNCEME’s forecasting. Indeed, FUNCEME’s
te¤ cnicos claim that forecasting information a¡ects the criteria for seed distribu-
tion because in years of below-average rainfall forecast, the number of required
moist days can be reduced so that farmers can take advantage of any oppor-
tunity to plant.20 In other words, in such years, SDR te¤ cnicos become less
conservative and are more willing to reconsider their requirement for the
conventional eleven-day period of moisture, since the latter might not occur at
all. Critics of the model, however, contend that the program’s insistence on
maintaining such a strict planting calendar is inconsistent with current levels of
skill ^ that is, the ability to predict temporal and geographical distribution of
rainfall for a given region ^ available for Northeast Brazil. At such levels,
seasonal climate forecasts are virtually useless for the kind of precise informa-
tion required to decide on a speci¢c day and region for seed distribution.21
From the subsistence farmers’ point of view, Hora de Plantar has many
shortcomings. First, it is onerous ^ both in terms of resources and time ^ to
comply with the program’s requirements. Many times farmers have to take
several costly trips, ¢rst to register, and then to pick up seed. Because the
distribution process can take days and the planting window is short (around
eleven days), it may not be worthwhile for small farmers to participate in the
program. Second, even at a discount price, it is expensive for some very poor
farmers to participate in the program. Finally, farmers strongly resent Hora de
Plantar ’s planting calendar and its imposition over their own best judgment.
When asked why they had stopped participating in Hora de Plantar, approxi-
mately 20% of the subsistence farmers interviewed in the six munic|¤ pios o¡ered
‘wrong’ distribution time as the number one reason, second only to availability
of their own seeds (30%).
Because for many subsistence farmers the Hora de Plantar program is the
only source of seed ^ especially after a multi-year drought when farmers’
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capacity to store seeds from previous yields dwindles ^ SDR’s distribution
process can become very damaging to farmers, particularly when it rains and
farmers have no seed. Both extension te¤ cnicos and the union leaders of rural
workers, interviewed for this study, agree that it is a ‘worst possible scenario’
because, in such a case, many farmers perceive this situation almost as a sinful
‘waste’ of precious rain. In the words of one farmer, ‘Many times I will prepare
the land in the dry [meaning even before the ¢rst rains fall to soften the soil and
make the use of a manual or animal traction plow easier] because this way I am
showing God my faith that He will send us rain.’ Moreover, because there are
not many available work alternatives outside of the farm (and thus no oppor-
tunity cost for staying on their land), farmers often prefer planting and losing to
not planting at all. According to one farmer, ‘Even if I plant and lose, at least I
have a chance.When I don’t plant, I know for sure I won’t have anything to eat.’
For this reason, many rainfed subsistence farmers will initiate planting even if
they do not have much hope of incoming rain. Therefore, although the result is
the same ^ lost crops, in most cases, farmers prefer to plant and lose rather
than not to plant and be surprised by rain. At great sacri¢ce, whenever they
can, most farmers store their own seed (which otherwise could be comsumed as
food) from one season to the next, so as not to depend onHora de Plantar.22
By keeping the planting calendar, SDR is, in essence, deciding for farmers
when it is the best time to plant. SDR’s te¤ cnicos believe that their methods are
consistently superior to those of farmers who, if left to their own devices, either
waste the seeds by planting at the ‘wrong’ time or eat them in periods of food
shortage. Although there might be cases of farmers eating or selling the seeds,
SDR’s argument is weakened by the fact that most farmers do save their own
seed from one year to another. According to one farmer: ‘When SDR says we
eat the seed, it shows no respect for the farmer. If we save two liters of our own
seed no matter how bad our condition is, why would we eat the government’s
seed? If a farmer believes he has to plant in a certain time, he has to be
respected.’ Table 2 shows the declining level of participation inHora de Plantar
in the sixmunic|¤ pios studied.












Guaraciaba do Norte 44 42
Total 54 41
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At ¢rst glance ^ especially considering the limitations of the soil-climate
model ^ it seems to make little sense for SDR to assume the risk of making such
a high-stake decision. However, a closer look reveals that SDR does not have
much to lose. First, farmers and their families, who may face food shortage at
the end of the season, bear the worst consequence of failure. Second, although
SDR has been the target of some criticism, it is FUNCEME ^ which the
media, policy-makers, and the public in general have consistently blamed for
their ‘wrong’ forecasts ^ that withstands the worst of the negative publicity
concerning failure (Lemos et al., 2002).23 Indeed farmers often believe
FUNCEME is responsible for both lack of seeds and lack of rural credit. In
interviews, bank managers and extension agents admitted o¡ering FUNCEME’s
forecasts as the reason for denying credit and seeds to farmers.24 So much is at
stake when basing decisions on FUNCEME’s climate forecast that, to avoid
social unrest, a member of the state’s legislature proposed forbidding the agency
to publicly release this information. In addition, in 1997 the state legislature
held hearings on FUNCEME’s work. During these sessions, a few representa-
tives questioned the need for the agency’s existence. Consequently, it is not
surprising that FUNCEME has become increasingly reluctant to divulge the
forecast (Lemos et al., 2002). In the past few years, the agency has attempted
both to distance itself from Hora de Plantar and to devise new methods of
information communication that stress the probabilistic character of climate
forecasting.25 Although SDR has the ultimate responsibility for generating and
enforcing the planting calendar, it has been able to ‘shift the blame’ to
FUNCEME. Yet, while this strategy may shield SDR in the short run, it has
been tremendously detrimental to FUNCEME and has signi¢cantly eroded the
public’s trust in forecasts in general. Farmers interviewed for this study often
reported that, upon receiving FUNCEME’s forecast, they are inclined to believe
that exactly the opposite forecast will be true. For example, according to one
farmer, ‘Every time FUNCEME tells us it is going to rain, I know there will be
a drought coming.’ During the three years of drought that coincided with the
¢eld research for this study, many di¡erent versions of this type of statement
were heard in interviews. In this study’s survey sample, only seven percent of
the farmers interviewed declared they believed FUNCEME’s seasonal fore-
casts (Lemos et al., 2002).
In sum, through its use of climate information, Hora de Plantar insulates
program implementation not only from outside interference but also from its
clientele. On the one hand, farmers resent Hora de Plantar ’s imposition of a
planting calendar and correctly argue that, although they are not allowed to
make the decision whether or not to plant, they are the ones bearing the
consequences. On the other hand, although SDR is able to ‘shift the blame’ of
failure to FUNCEME, it does so at the expense of the credibility of seasonal
forecasting information. In 2001, SDR decided to change Hora de Plantar by
de-coupling seed distribution from the soil/climate model. Now, seeds are
made available to farmers at the beginning of the season, and it is the individual
farmer who then decides the best time to plant (Lemos et al, 2002).
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Emergency Drought-Relief. The second program analyzed in this study ^
Emergency Drought-Relief ^ has been undergoing change since the 1979^1983
event, when the Northeast’s mostly outdated and clientelistic policy-making
apparatus proved unable to mitigate the severe e¡ects of drought. As discussed
in the previous section, it took the election of a progressive governor in Ceara¤
in 1987 to deepen the reform of the state emergency response system by
creating a community-based program. Since then, the program has gone
through further changes that consolidated and expanded its community-based
approach.
The political implications of the distribution of emergency relief resources
are three-fold. First, work fronts have traditionally played an important politi-
cal role in Ceara¤ ’s rural areas. Usually the last means of survival for many poor
families, the work fronts have been the target of much criticism and contro-
versy. As mentioned earlier, these fronts have been a powerful bargaining
instrument for local political bosses who, through classic clientelism, exchange
votes for placement in work fronts. In addition, much of the construction work
carried out by the fronts would either be located withing properties belonging
to powerful individuals (e.g., water reservoirs and dams) or would directly
bene¢t the interests of the powerful (e.g., roads, water channels, etc.). Similarly,
the distribution of water trucks and food baskets was often used for political
and economic gain. The costs of trucking water can add up quickly, since most
of the communities in distress are located far from urban centers or water
sources. In many cases, tank trucks are contracted out, and in the past, local
governments would bill the state government for the distance traveled by each
truck. To make matters worse, there was little monitoring, so the billing system
was greatly vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Finally, under o⁄cial emergency
status, local governments dramatically increase not only the amount of their
budgets through the injection of federal and state emergency funds but also
their discretion over them. Therefore, local elites have a keen interest in keeping
unchallenged their ability to declare emergencies and to distribute locally the
relief resources.
The new system, which started in the late 1980s but was constantly changed
throughout the 1990s, improved the old clientelistic model in several ways. It
democratized local instances of decision by installingmunic|¤ pio-based commit-
tees that are responsible for identifying the neediest families in each drought-
a¡ected community. By the early 1990s, the coordination of these committees
was transferred to Civil Defense te¤ cnicos, who supervised their workings and
closely monitored the implementation of emergency fronts. Community repre-
sentatives in the committees ^ now called COMDECs (Comite“ de Defesa Civil )
^ generate a list, ranking the families of each community according to need.
These lists are then prioritized within the munic|¤ pio and used as a basis for the
distribution of jobs, food baskets, and water trucks.
The transition from the clientelistic model to the new more democratic
COMDECs, however, was not smooth. Although, since the beginning, the
Civil Defense agency had the governor’s support in reforming the system, in
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practice, implementation proved complex. Not surprisingly, local political
bosses ¢ercely resisted Civil Defense’s new model and attempted to undermine
it, either by capturing local committees and trying to control their membership
or by directly lobbying the governor to curb the te¤ cnicos’ actions in their strong-
holds.26
Although Civil Defense te¤ cnicos are quick to praise the governor for resist-
ing such pressure, they soon realized they needed more than the state govern-
ment’s support to deal with the day-to-day politics of resource distribution in
Ceara¤ ’s many munic|¤ pios. One particularly di⁄cult task was to challenge local
political bosses on their turfs ^ some of them many times removed from the
direct sphere of in£uence of the state government. On the one hand, te¤ cnicos
were mostly perceived as outsiders, so their mandate tended to dissipate in the
context of local politics. On the other hand, the governor’s reliance on these
local politicians for electoral support places the te¤ cnicos in a delicate position.
It is in this context that the use of science-generated information, especially
climate information, played a critical role in facilitating the implementation of
Civil Defense’s new approach to drought emergency relief. Indeed, Civil Defense
te¤ cnicos were able to shield themselves under the cloak of science to challenge
the old clientelistic model.
A particularly innovative initiative was the creation, in 1997, of a need-based
ranking for emergency relief of all the munic|¤ pios in the state. Te¤ cnicos from
Civil Defense established a series of criteria to rank munic|¤ pios according to
their vulnerability to drought and need for emergency relief. These criteria
included rainfall quantity and distribution, runo¡, yield losses by munic|¤ pio,
vegetation index, and social unrest. All of the data used in this model ^ with the
exception of the social unrest and crop yields ^ is provided by FUNCEME.
Here again seasonal climate forecasts, although not directly used in the model,
are described by te¤ cnicos as ‘background’ information that warns them of the
need to activate their local capabilities to implement the Emergency Drought-
Relief. Despite its limited current use of climate forecasts, high-rank policy-
makers at the Secretary of Planning and Civil Defense expect that, in its next
incarnation, the program will be able to rely substantially on this kind of
information to plan for drought. A new proposal to restructure the Emergency-
Drought-Relief program calls for implementation of an integrated system of
permanent response, the main goal of which is to decrease vulnerability to
climate variability. In this case, seasonal climate forecasts have the potential
for contributing to early preparation and budget planning.
After te¤ cnicos from Civil Defense establish the ranking ofmunic|¤ pios accord-
ing to need, they prioritize the implementation of emergency relief. Next, the
munic|¤ pios at the top of the ranking are allowed to declare drought emergency,
which, in turn, quali¢es their local governments to receive relief resources.
Here, climate information provides Civil Defense te¤ cnicos with su⁄cient
weight to face political challenge to their programs from local politicians.
According to one te¤ cnico, the creation of the ranking has enabled him to
challenge local mayors’ claims of distress by confronting them with detailed
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compilation of crop losses, rainfall distribution, and runo¡. The satellite pic-
tures showing crops and vegetation and the computer-generated maps showing
rainfall distribution are particularly compelling as ‘proof’ why such amunic|¤ pio
is not getting help or why another one has the priority. ‘Now, when they come
knocking at my door and I show them the numbers, it is not I anymore saying
‘‘No.’’ ’ 27
The di¡erent behavior of SDR and Civil Defense can be partly explained by
their di¡erent approaches to drought planning. Both SDR and Civil Defense
recognize that their reputations hinge on their ability to implement policy that
addresses the devastating e¡ects of drought in Ceara¤ . Their means for imple-
menting it, however, are markedly di¡erent. Whereas Civil Defense strives to
promote inclusionary approaches, SDR alienates its clientele and shifts the
blame for failure to FUNCEME.
While SDR is a highly hierarchical institution, Civil Defense follows a much
looser pattern of organization.28 On the one hand, Civil Defense te¤ cnicos are
very open and candid about the di⁄culties of changing the distribution of
emergency relief in the state. They take great pride in their work and consider
themselves almost as crusaders for the governor’s reformist approach. They are
¢ercely protective of their program, and recent changes introduced by the
governor ^ who transferred control of the program from Civil Defense to the
Secratary of Planning ^ have left many of them disappointed. They resent the
hierarchy of the new system and fear for the future of the program.
On the other hand, SDR mid-level te¤ cnicos were more careful not to contra-
dict higher ranked technocrats within the agency. Most of the te¤ cnicos inter-
viewed were agronomists transferred from SDR’s extension agency. Other SDR
personnel involved in Hora de Plantar were also interviewed, especially exten-
sion agents responsible for registration of farmers and distribution of seeds at
the local level. Their demeanor was more relaxed than te¤ cnicos in the capital,
and their commitment to the clientele was higher. For example, many of the
local extension agents disagreed with SDR’s policy of keeping the planting
calendar. An extension agent argued that his greater ‘experience’ with farm
work and with the rural way of thinking, as well as his witnessing of farmers’
di⁄culties, had convinced him that farmers should be able to make their own
planting decisions. In his view, which was shared by other extension agents,
SDR should increase resources at the ¢eld level so that extension agents could
provide better support and advice to farmers, enabling them to make better
informed decisions at their own discretion. Even SDR mid-level te¤ cnicos ^ who
were much more careful about the kind of information they volunteered ^
pointed out that, in cases of high uncertainty, they thought it better to let small
farmers make their own decisions about when to plant, based on their experi-
ences and local conditions. As mentioned above, in 2000, SDR decided to
authorize the distribution of seeds directly at the beginning of the rainy season,
before the release of FUNCEME’s forecast, leaving the farmers to decide when
to plant.29 Still, a few higher ranked technocrats at SDR remain convinced that
early distribution of seed is a ‘waste.’30
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Conclusions
Going back to the question I asked at the beginning of this article, I ¢nd that
more important than establishing whether science can ‘save’ Northeast Brazil,
is understanding ways in which science, in particular climate-related informa-
tion, can positively a¡ect public policy-making processes in Northeast Brazil
and other drought-ridden regions of the world. Hence, even if science does not
hold the key to the solution of Northeast Brazil’s drought problem, it can surely
play a role in the design of policies that not only mitigate drought’s negative
e¡ects but also reinforce positive values, such as public accountability and the
democratization of decision-making processes.
Considering the two dimensions of societal bene¢ts proposed at the begin-
ning of this article ^ climate information’s value in improving drought policy-
making and climate information’s role in positively a¡ecting broader processes
of decision- and policy-making within Brazilian politics ^ the programs evalu-
ated here fared substantially di¡erently. This evaluation suggests that, despite
policy-makers’ enthusiasm for seasonal climate forecasting as a policy tool, its
use was mostly described as ‘background information,’ with little evidence of
actual use in pro-active planning for mitigating and responding to drought in
Ceara¤ . Yet such ¢nding does not invalidate the potential of climate forecasts to
play an important role in future drought policy-making, especially in the con-
text of Ceara¤ ’s new integrated program for planning and responding to
drought. Other kinds of climate information, such as rainfall distribution and
quantity, were found to play a substantive role in a policy-maker’s ability to
implement policy, both in agricultural planning and in emergency drought-
relief planning. As to climate information’s e¡ects on broader processes of
decision- and policy-making in Ceara¤ , the two programs analyzed in this
article tell di¡erent stories.
The ¢rst program,Hora de Plantar, distributes high-quality seeds to rainfed
subsistence farmers according to a planting calendar based on a soil-climate
model that establishes the ‘best time to plant’ in di¡erent geoclimatic regions of
Ceara¤ . Despite model limitations and high levels of client dissatisfaction, policy-
makers responsible for program implementation believe in the superiority of
their methods over the best judgment of farmers. Although it makes little sense
for technocrats to make risky planting decisions for farmers, the rewards for
SDR are two-fold. First, the agency bears little risk for its decisions, since the
farmers and their families are the ones most vulnerable to famine in case of
crop failure. Moreover, by shifting the blame for failure to FUNCEME and its
forecast, SDR defuses criticism concerning its implementation of the program.
Second, SDR is able to insulate its policy-making process from outside med-
dling, especially from clients. However, such insulation comes at the expense of
both FUNCEME’s and forecasting information’s credibility. From the SDR’s
point of view, as long as the program had not negatively a¡ected the agency,
there was little inventive to reform it. The fact that SDR has changed its
distribution methods, after the results of this study were presented to the
community in 2000, reinforces this point.
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The second program, Emergency Drought Relief, has undergone signi¢cant
change in the past decade. From a clientelism- and corruption-infested pro-
gram, it is now considered one of the best examples of Ceara¤ ’s new progressive
politics. However, the extent and reach of such changes were not easy to
accomplish. Although the program had the state government’s support, its
implementation in the context of day-to-day local politics was constantly chal-
lenged by the pattern of clientelistic politics historically dominant in drought-
relief policy-making in the Northeast. Here the use of climate information
critically enhanced the ability of Civil Defense te¤ cnicos to democratize emer-
gency relief implementation, both in terms of community participation and
equitable distribution of resources.
Five conclusions of broader signi¢cance can be drawn from this discussion.
First, the Ceara¤ case demonstrates that, in politically charged policy-making
environments, the use of climate forecasting information may go beyond its
problem-solving function to in£uence broader issues of accountability and
democratization, especially in less developed countries. Indeed, climate infor-
mation can be used in ways ^ positive and negative ^ signi¢cantly di¡erent
from the use information producers intended. Thus, in the Hora de Plantar
program, while climate information producers in Ceara¤ hoped their work
would be used as a tool to improve pro-active drought-relief policy-making, it
was used to impose a planting calendar that ignores clients’ interests and
insulates policy-making from public accountability. In the case of Emergency
Drought-Relief, climate-related information contributed to support policy-
makers’ e¡orts to rid drought-relief policy-making from clientelistic, rent-seek-
ing practices. The Ceara¤ case further suggests that the value of the information
is only partially dependent on its skill since, even at low skill, climate informa-
tion can be used to further policy agendas not necessarily associated with the
original goals of the information producers. These ¢ndings question the assump-
tion that better forecast use will undoubtedly follow improved skill. This does
not mean that improved skill will not make for better information use in
drought planning; rather it suggests that even at improved skill, information
can be ill used if utilized not as an enhancement but as a palatable substitute to
other policies more likely to decrease the vulnerability of poor farmers to
climate variability.
Second, di¡erent from the Brazilian traditional technocratic model ^ in
which insulation is engendered mostly through political leadership, in the cases
examined here, government support was necessary but not su⁄cient to guaran-
tee policy implementation. Thus, in circumstances where the political leader-
ship is vulnerable to electoral politics (i.e., democracies), science-based infor-
mation may function as a critical factor, enabling policy-makers to avoid
political meddling and corruption of policy-intended goals. Consequently, in
some cases, science-generated policy tools may be pivotal in enhancing agency
capacity to implement public policy.
Third, the use of technical and scienti¢c information provides technocrats
with a unique opportunity to ‘shift the blame’ of policy failure elsewhere. For
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example, because climate forecast information is highly uncertain, policy fail-
ure can always be attributed to information’s lack of spatial and temporal skill.
Although this position suggests a paradox between technocrats’ beliefs in the
superiority of science-based information and their willingness to blame it for
failure, their rationale is justi¢ed by what they perceive to be the risks of work-
ing at the frontier of scienti¢c knowledge. Furthermore, technocrats can always
argue that the solution to the shortcomings of these tools may be further
funding for research to improve the information.
Fourth, attempts to insulate policy-making can back¢re and create exactly
the opposite e¡ect, that is, excessive politicization of the policy-making process
and unnecessary discredit of science-generated information. By pushing for the
use of experimental information as an operational tool, policy-makers and
information-producers may compromise their problem-solving potential as
skill improves. Thus, policy-makers and knowledge-producers must take stock
of the costs associated with the ‘operationalization’ of predictive science. Deci-
sion-makers crossing the barrier between science and policy must be aware of
the unwarranted and often negative consequences of such moves and their
implications for the future.
Finally, the two cases examined in this article illustrate the importance of
context ^ political, environmental, economic, and cultural ^ in the use of
science-generated policy tools. In addition, they suggest that the value of such
tools may go far beyond their inherent quality or ability to improve in terms of
skill. Therefore, it is necessary for both information-producers and policy-
makers to be keenly aware of the context whenever science-based tools are to
be applied.
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Notes
1. This research is part of a larger project to understand the use of seasonal climate forecasting in
NE Brazil, funded by the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Field research was carried out from 1997^2001, by a team of graduate students and
professors from the University of Arizona and the Universidade Federal do Ceara¤ (UFC).We
surveyed 480 households in six counties in the state of Ceara¤ and conducted in-depth inter-
views with state- and local-level policy-makers and leaders, including the state Governor,
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technocrats from FUNCEME, rural extension agents, water resource managers, civil defense
employees, rural labor-union representatives, and journalists.
2. The ENSO is caused by large-scale interactions between the ocean and atmosphere. The term
El Nin‹ o refers to a sequence of changes in circulations across the Paci¢c Ocean which results
in altered weather patterns across the globe. Seasonal climate forecasts attempt to predict
ENSO and other seasonal climate phenomena with a lead-time of up to a year in some regions.
Other kinds of climate information relevant to this study include weather forecasts (prediction
of climate patterns up to a week in advance), rainfall historical series (recorded rainfall within
a period of time), and statistical models (prediction of rainfall based on the extrapolation of
previous recorded rainfall).
3. FUNCEME, created in the 1970s, has a reputation for being a highly skilled and well-equipped
regional meteorological center in tune with state-of-the-art technology available in the ¢eld.
4. For an exception, see Sarewitz and Pielke (1999) and Sarewitz, Pielke and Byerly Jr. (2000).
For more on the application of climate forecasting in other less developed countries see,
Roncoli et al. (2001), Orlove and Tosteston (1999) and Broad et al. (2002).
5. The model, called MUSAG, will be discussed in further detail later in this article.
6. Amunic|¤ pio is a political division within states that roughly corresponds to a U.S. county.
7. The most recent drought, from 1997 to 1999, resulted in approximately 80 percent loss of crop
yields in some parts of the Brazilian Northeast, causing considerable social unrest. For
example, in early 1997 in the town of Baturite¤ , about 500 rural workers occupied the municipal
capital building to demand water trucks for their communities and employment in work fronts.
In Jose¤ Milton Rocha, ‘Prefeitura de Baturite¤ e¤ ocupada por agricultores,’OPovo (Fortaleza,
Ceara¤ ), 8 March 1997.
8. These policies ranged from the conventional ^ such as the distribution of food baskets among
poor families a¡ected by drought ^ to the bizarre as exempli¢ed by the importation of fourteen
camels from Northern Africa to work as farm animals in Ceara¤ in the late XVIII century. For
an interesting description of the history of drought and government response, seeVilla (2000).
9. Personal communication, August 1997.
10. Personal communication, August 1997.
11. For a critical review of some of these programs, see Magalha‹ es et al. (1991) and Pessoa (1987).
12. For the past ¢fteen years, the state government in Ceara¤ has gone from an entrenched
oligarchy of a few traditional political families to the most progressive state government in the
Northeast. The shift started in 1987 with the election of Tasso Jereissati as governor. Then
came his succession by Ciro Gomes in 1991 and Jereissati’s return to power in 1994, followed
by his reelection in 1998.
13. Climate variability refers to the variation of climate patterns from season to season and from
year to year.
14. It should be emphasized that even though Ceara¤ has recently generated more progressive
leaders, in order to win elections they still rely heavily on the electoral vote under the control
of traditional political strongholds in the state’s interior. In three of the last four gubernatorial
elections (with the exception of 1990), votes from the interior have been critical since the
winning candidates systematically lost in the capital city of Fortaleza (Moraes, 2000).
15. Te¤ cnicos or technicians are mid-level professionals whose work within the public policy appa-
ratus is rooted on professional expertise.
16. In a comparative study of bureaucracies in the United States, Korea, and Brazil, Steel et al.
(1993: p. 423) report that Brazilian civil servants have the highest level of support for technoc-
racy, although their support for outside in£uence on policy-making (from elected o⁄cials and
voters) was also high (66 percent an 73.4 percent, respectively).
17. Some of these phenomena are the El Nin‹ o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), La Nin‹ a, the Inter-
Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), Ocean Surface Temperature (OST), wind conditions, and
teleconnections.
18. For further detail FUNCEME’s conceptual model, see Lemos et al., 2002.
19. Hora de Plantar distributes four kinds of seeds: corn, rice, and two kinds of beans ^ a fast
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growing type more suitable to short growing seasons and a slower growing type with higher
productivity and market value. Beans, corn, and rice are the principal crops of small farmers in
the Northeast.
20. Personal communication, 1997.
21. In addition, critics have pointed out that the model relies on insu⁄cient, outdated, and low-
quality data, especially regarding soil surveying. For example, the soil map currently used in
the model was put together in the late 1970s at a scale of 1 : 600,000 km2 and is clearly too
coarse for the kind of speci¢c planting advice model-runners want to give out to farmers.
Personal communication, 1997; 1998.
22. Personal communication, 2000.
23. FUNCEME scientists have repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to communicate the
probabilistic nature of their forecast. By most accounts, the agency has been consistently hurt
by bad publicity related to both seed and credit distribution.
24. In 1997, for example, it was reported in the media that, in a public protest in the city of Taua¤ ,
local farmers marched into the city central square carrying a co⁄n with FUNCEME’s name
on it. They wanted to ‘bury’ the agency after the local bank refused them credit, allegedly based
on FUNCEME’s forecast of low rainfall for the region.
25. In 2001 a new administration took o⁄ce at FUNCEME. The agency’s new president is com-
mitted to the need to adopt new approaches to communicate forecasts. Personal communica-
tion, 2001.
26. For example, one te¤ cnico pointed out that the situation can get so politically charged that Civil
Defense o⁄cial cars have to be disguised (usually they carry the agency’s logo on their doors),
so as to avoid problems and potential violence. Personal communication, 2000.
27. Personal communication, 1998.
28. This di¡erence became clear when I tried to schedule interviews with both agencies. While I
had no problem contacting and talking to Civil Defense te¤ cnicos as many times as I needed in
the three years I carried out ¢eld work in Ceara¤ , the process was much more complex
regarding SDR te¤ cnicos. In my ¢rst contact with Hora de Plantar te¤ cnicos, I was unable to
talk to them separately. The interview was carried out as a group, but most of the information
was provided by the head of the division.When I tried to contact a new group of te¤ cnicos at a
later occasion, I was referred to their superiors for a formal authorization.
29. SRD policymakers interviewed in December 2000 recognized that this decision was partically
in£uenced by the ¢ndings of the University of Arizona/NOAA study, which were presented to
policymakers and the public in a high pro¢le workshop held in August of 2000 in Fortaleza,
Ceara¤ .
30. Personal communication, 2000.
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